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1 - Introduction 
In recent years a considerable effort has gone into the study of financial , 
markets under asymmetric information in an attempt to explain the failure of 
those markets to engender efficient levels of investment (1). In contrast with 
the economics of capital structure in modern corporations (2), this literature has 
paid relatively little attention to the theoretical analysis of the effects stemming 
from the mixed form of financial arrangement. Optimal contracts between two 
parties assume either the form of debt, as in de Meza and Webb (1987), Gale 
and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1987), or the form of equity, as shown by 
de Meza and Webb (1987) in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 ). And yet modern 
corporations exhibit in their capital structure both debt and equity (inside and 
outside). Moreover, on the theoretical level, 0. Williamson (1988) shows that 
an optimal mix of debt and equity, which is termed «dequity», may supplant 
both debt and equity. Likewise, Stiglitz notes that «these forms of financial 
constraints are but extreme examples, demonstrating clearly that the financial 
structure of firms can make a difference. Theories of optimal financial structure 
can be derived, with the optimal structure depending. on the nature of the 
information problem being faced•• (1988, p. 124). Inspired by the works of Leland 
and Pyle (1977) and de Meza and Webb (1990), the present study seeks to 
fill this lacuna by analysing a model in which a mixed form of financial contracts 
between financial institutions and firms is possible. 
The structure of information plays a crucial role in the model. The main 
goal of the present analysis is to examine the effects of incomplete information 
and of the capital structure of firms on the nature of financial equilibrium. In 
addition, the study endeavours to show that the results derived in the literature 
of credit markets are not robust to changes in model specifications. It aims at 
contributing to the advance of the economics of credit markets by offering further 
insights. 
(") This paper is based on chapter 3 of my D.Phil dissertation, «The Economics of Credit 
Markets: Theory and Evidence», 1993, York University, England. I would like to thank my 
supervisors, Peter Simmons and Brian Hillier, for many helpful discussions. I have also benefitted 
from comments from my examiners, David de Meza and John Hey. All mistakes remain my own 
responsibility. 
(") Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa. 
( 1) For a recent survey of this literature see Hillier and lbrahimo (1993). 
(2) For a survey of the literature on capital structure of modern corporations see Harris and 
Raviv (1991). 
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The structure of the model is defined in section 2. The context is a simple 
one-period partial equilibrium model with informational asymmetries. In the 
model, entrepreneurs are considered to behave in a risk-averse manner and 
each of them is endowed with a project at the beginning of the period. The 
projects, if undertaken, require outside finance from risk-neutral bankers, who 
offer financial contracts to entrepreneurs. All projects are assumed to have the 
same expected return and are divided into two types: one with a high probability 
of securing the successful return and a second with a low probability. The 
quality of an individual entrepreneur's project, that is, the success probability 
- not known by the financial institutions - is private information. The gene-
ralisation of the analysis to continuous categories of entrepreneurs is discussed 
in the conclusion. 
Section 3 develops the model established. It negative incentive effects 
are not considered, the financial equilibrium involves pooling equilibrium with 
both categories of projects being entirely financed through outside equity. With 
this type of solution there can be no adverse selection and social efficiency is 
achieved. Indeed, if the capital structure of firms is wholly absorbed by outside 
equity, all projects will be equally attractive to risk-neutral financiers. 
A special case is investigated in section 4. The assumption that equity 
contract entails no costs seems unreasonable because of moral hazard 
problems. Incentive effects may justify an optimal small proportion of outside 
equity in the capital structure of firms (3). It is therefore assumed that in all 
projects the share of equity held by outside investors is fixed and relatively 
small. With this assumption and no all debt finance, the model exhibits 
interesting properties. The first conclusion of this section is that if the equilibrium 
separating contract is dominant - as defined in the paper- in a set of 
contracts on offer, it will necessarily be the unique equilibrium. Thus, there 
cannot be a pooling equilibrium. However, under quite plausible conditions 
equilibrium may not exist, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). 
The second conclusion is that credit rationing, as defined in Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981 ), is not viable. This result is consistent with that of Bester (1985), 
although in a different setting. The model need not use collateral requirements 
to induce entrepreneurs to self-select themselves into categories and make 
rationing impracticable. 
The third conclusion refers to welfare properties. The competitive equi-
librium is not economically efficient. As in Rothschild and Stiglitz, there is a 
dissipative externality, i. e. the existence of the high-risk investors produces a 
negative effect on the low-risk investors. But more importantly, in separating 
equilibrium, aggregate investment falls short of the first-best level and thus a 
subsidy on bank financing leads to a Pareto improvement. 
Finally, capital structure of firms does matter. In disagreement with 
Modigliani and M\ller (1958), the relative magnitude of outside equity makes a 
(3) An interesting rationale for an optimal level of outside equity in the capital structure of 
firms is provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp. 349-50). 
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real difference to the quantity of aggregate investment in equilibrium. And 
interestingly, as in Harris and Raviv (1991) and Ross (1977), the leverage of 
firm is positively associated with default probability. 
Section 5 offers some concluding comments. 
2 - A model of investment finance 
The context is a simple one-period partial equilibrium model with 
informational asymmetries between financial institutions and entrepreneurs. The 
analysis is intended to decipher the nature of equilibrium and the causes of 
capital market failures. 
The basic assumptions of the model as well as the behaviour and 
objectives of economic agents are indicated below. Entrepreneurs' projects differ 
in risk and the problem analysed is that of financing them by own equity, debt 
and outside equity; this framework draws on and synthesises the works of 
Leland and Pyle (1977), de Meza and Webb (1990} and Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981 ). 
Consider a capital market in which there are two classes of economic 
agents: potential entrepreneurs who are in need of finance and banks who 
make it available. 
Entrepreneurs are risk-averse, expected utility maximisers, all with 
identical quasi-concave utility function of end of period wealth, U (.). They 
each have the same initial wealth, W0 , which can be invested either in an 
indivisible amount of investment, denoted by K, or in a safe asset yielding 
the same interest rate p. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that deposit 
is the unique safe asset in the market, so if projects are not carried out, W0 
is deposited with banks. The ith project, if executed, yields a random return 
R; of RP if it succeeds and R/ if it fails. Adaptation of the mean preserving 
spread criterion of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) implies that all projects have 
a common expected gross return 11: 
(1) P; (Rn RP + [1 -Pi (Rn] R/ =a constant, for all i 
where Pi, defined in [0,1 ], is the success probability of the ith project. Without 
any loss of generality, consider that R/ = R' for all i. Projects differ in risk and 
since Pi depends on R;5 , they consequently differ in successful return. In the 
present analysis it is enough to assume only two categorie~ of entrepreneurs (4): 
high-risk individuals with success probability PH (RH5 ) and low-risk individuals 
with success probability PL (RL5 ) > PH(RH5 ). This condition with (1) implies that 
projects are ranked by the mean preserving spread criterion. In what follows 
the subscript i will denote the entrepreneur's category. 
To cause the need for the outside finance it is assumed that W0 < K, so 
if a project is to be carried into execution additional finance must be raised. 
(4) The terms entrepreneur and project are used interchangeably. 
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This is done through the issuance of outside equity and/or debt securities. Debt 
security of current value B pays in the successful state an amount D = (1 + r)B, 
where r is the posted loan rate, or else pays the entire project return to the 
bank in the event of bankruptcy. Then the return on debt is min(D,R), and 
the return on equity is max(R-D,O), where j = s,f. The proportion of inside equity 
in the project is 0 $; ex $; 1 , which is held by the entrepreneur, and the remainder 
- the outside equity- is sold to a bank. For the acquisition of debt security . 
with face value of repayment D and the proportion (1 - o:) of the equity, the 
bank agrees to pay a value F. 
Successful states must reward both entrepreneurs and banks. Thus, it 
makes sense to assume R;5 > D. If a project of category i is successful, the 
entrepreneur end of period wealth is: 
(2) W;5 =ex (R;5 - D)+ (1 + p) (F + Wo-K) 
and in the low state he obtains (5): 
(3) W/ = W =ex [max(R'- 0,0)] + (1 + p) (F + W0 - K) 
From the expected utility theorem, the entrepreneur's preferences for 
income in the two states of nature are described by the following function (6): 
(4) EU(W;) = p;U(W;5 ) + (1- p;)U(W), i= H, L 
The entrepreneur of category i will execute his project if: 
(5) EU{W;} ~ U[(1 + p)W0] 
A group of few large banks supply finance. They are assumed to be 
competitive, risk-neutral expected profit maximisers. Competition is of Bertrand 
type in price strategies. Banks pay for each unit of deposits the interest rate. p; 
other costs as well as activities of banking are neglected. The supply of funds 
to a bank is assumed to be non-decreasing in the safe rate of interest, p. 
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, this relationship is given 
exogenously and thus not derived from first principles. It is assumed that banks 
have knowledge about the proportion of each of the two categories of 
entrepreneurs, 'A; E [0,1 ], with 'AL + 'AH = 1. Furthermore, they know the success 
probability p; of each type. However, banks cannot distinguish ex ante the 
characteristics of each entrepreneur's project. This assumption introduces the 
key asymmetry of information into the model. The ex post return of each project 
once executed is assumed to be observable without cost to both bank and 
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entrepreneur. When finance is made available, the financial contract specifies 
its terms F, a and D. With this contract offered to an entrepreneur of category i, 
in the successful state the bank makes a profit of: 
(6) rt&;= rta D+ (1- a) (R;5 - D)- (1 + p)F, ;.; H,L 
and in the low state: 
(7) rt~; = rtb = min(O,R1) + (1 -a) max(R'- D, 0)- (1 + p )F 
where R1 can be greater or smaller than D. Thus, the expected profit to the 
bank from a project of category i and the above contract is: 
(8) E(rta;) = P;rt§;+ (1- P;) rt~ 
where p;= p;(R;5 ). 
In the present study, coalition between agents is ruled out and each 
entrepreneur can only carry out one project. 
The following definition is now introduced. 
Definition 1.- Equilibrium in the competitive capital market is a set of 
financial contracts such that all contracts in the equilibrium set yield zero 
expected profit to banks; and there exists no other contract in the exterior of 
the equilibrium set which - if offered - generates a non-negative expected 
profit. 
Definition 1 implies a Bertrand competition. Each bank expects that the 
rivals will keep the terms of financial contracts invariable, irrespective of its 
own decisions. 
The next section develops the model here established and the properties 
of the market equilibrium are inspected (?). 
' . 
3 - Financial equilibrium in the model 
The interpretation of (1) is that projects differ according to the mean 
preserving spread.criterion: all projects are assumed to have the same expected 
value, J.!, but riskier projects have a larger variance in returns than less risky 
ones (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This section shows that, under some 
conditions, the properties of equilibrium in capital markets with asymmetric 
information may not differ from those of complete information. 
(?) In this model, if projects were ranked by the first-order stochastic dominance, i.e. if 
investment projects differed 'in ability, de Meza and Webb (1990) would be obtained and different 
results would follow. More precisely, capital market failure would imply over-investment with pooling 
equilibriur:n. 
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Bertrand competition implies that (8) must equal zero in a manner 
corresponding to the explanation given below. This condition yields the following 
equation for the offer of financial contracts in ( W, WS) space: 
(9) WP=-[(1-pi)/pi]W/+ (1/pi) 0) + [~+ (1 + p) (Wo-K)] 
where Pi depends on Ri5 which is given for each entrepreneurs' category. The 
slope of an offer curve is given by - (1 -Pi )I Pi and, clearly, is steeper for the 
riskier category. The second term on the right hand side of (9) is positive since 
~ > (1 + p)(K- W0), otherwise projects would not be financed. 
Let the subscript A denote an «abstract•• average category of 
entrepreneurs; and let PA = A.L PL + 1 - A.L)pH be the success probability of 
category A entrepreneurs. Then substituting PA for Pi in (9), an average-risk 
offer locus is obtained, where a bank earns zero expected profit on average. 
The average-offer curve can be thought of as a benchmark to locate pooling 
contracts in ( W', WS) space. 
FIGURE 1 
Offer curves of a bank 
I 
0~._~,~--------------------------~_. w1 wf 
Figure 1 shows the offer lines OH, OA and OL derived from (8) with 
i = H,A,L respectively. The three lines cross the certainty line at the same point, 
since when a = 0 all projects are equally attractive for risk-neutral bankers who 
are willing to pay to all entrepreneurs the same actuarially fair price in both 
states. Consider the offer locus OH. From (2), (3) and (9), at point E, a = 0, 
DH = 0 and FH > K- W0 . WH5 is maximised if WH' = 0, which implies FH = K-
- W0 and DH;::: R'. Thus, the payoff at B can be sustained with many 
. combinations of aH and DH, one of which is all debt security finance, i. e. aH = 1. 
On the interior of the locus, aH, DH and FH vary, but FH must always be greater 
than or equal to K- W0 , otherwise projects cannot be carried out. 
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Consider now a financial contract, denoted by (F',a:,o·), on which a bank 
earns on average zero expected profit. The contract (F',c/,0*) must then lie 
on the OA locus -for instance at A in figure 1 - if offered to a hypothetical 
average-risk entrepreneur. This contract, however, may or may not yield a non-
zero expected profit if offered to either a high- or low-risk entrepreneur. Notice 
that in (2) and (3) RH5 > RL5 and RH'= R/ Thus, the contract (F',c/,0*) lies 
- on the vertical line through W/ as shown in figure 1 - above A if offered 
to a high-risk entrepreneur and below this point if offered to a low-risk one. 
Whether or not (F',a*,O') lies on the high- and low-risk offer curves will depend 
upon the value of a', as will be shown below. 
Suppose that both categories of entrepreneurs choose the contract 
(F',a',O'). Then WJ = W/ = Wand from {2) it follows that: 
(10) W~- W!= a· (Rk- RZ) =a· ()l- R,) [(PL- PH )I PHPL];:: 0 
But from (9), along the offer curves (e. g. comparing Hand L in figure 1 ): 
(11) W~- w{ = [- w + )l + (1 + p) (Wo-K)] [(pL- PH)/ PHPd;:: 0 
where W:::;; )l + (1 + p) (W0 - K). The values of the difference WH- WL in (10) 
and (11) need not be equal since the following may hold: 
(12) a*:::; or>[- W' + )l + (1 + p) (W0 - K)]l ()l- R') 
in which by assumption R' < (1 + p) (K- W0) (8). To simplify the description of 
(12), let [- W + )l + (1 + p) (W0 - K)]/ ()l- R') be <p. As a result of (12), three 
cases may occur. When a*= <p, (1 0) equals (11) and therefore the contract 
(F',a',O') which yields on average zero expected profit will also yield zero 
expected profit with each category. Thus, in this case, a risk-neutral bank looks 
indifferently at both categories of projects, since from the bank's viewpoint the 
low risk-projects are as profitable as the high-risk ones. The reason is that the 
relative amount of outside equity in projects is large enough to overcome the 
conflict of interests -stemming from the issuance of debt security- between 
bankers and entrepreneurs. An example of the present case is shown in figu-
re 1, where a given contract (F',a*,o') is at Hand L for the high- and low-risk 
groups respectively. But from the earlier discussion, if a·= 0, then 
vtf;S = W = )l + (1 + p) (W0 - K) and, therefore, (F',a',O') will be at point E for 
both groups. 
Using similar reasoning, it can easily be shown that if a*= <p, (F',a',D') 
will cause negative expected profit with category L entrepreneurs and positive 
expected profit with category H entrepreneurs. Thus, given a financial contract 
in which the proportion of outside equity is relatively large, riskier projects are 
the more profitable ones for banks. In figure 1 (F',a',D') must be below point 
(8 ) This assumption makes sense because projects involve risk. With this condition, in 
bankruptcy states the bank collects an amount which falls short of the value needed to compensate 
for the total cost of outside finance required in a project. 
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H and above point A for the high-risk group, and above L and below A for the 
low-risk group. 
The preferences of banks about project categories depend not only upon 
the nature of intermediation but depend also on the ownership structure of firms. 
The nature of financial contracts thus provides the rationale for the above results 
which are in contrast with the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) theorem that banks 
prefer less risky projects. This type of behaviour is not, however, ruled out in 
the present study, since whenever ex*> <p, riskier projects yield a lower expected 
profit for a bank. In figure 1, if the value of outside equity is relatively small 
(F",ex·,o·) must then lie above point H for the high-risk category and below 
point L for the low-risk one. Also notice that all debt security finance (ex*= 1) 
is an example of the present case. Implications of the special case 1 >ex*> <p 
are set out in the next section. 
Indifference curves of risk-averse entrpreneurs are derived from (4) and it 
is easy to verify that these curves are strictly convex and steeper, at any point 
to the left of the certainty line, for riskier projects. Moreover, indiference cur-
ves of each category are steeper than the respective bank's offer curve at 
any feasible contract (F·,ex·,o·). To save space, these curves are not here 
shown graphically. 
The following proposition is now established. 
Proposition 1. -Assume that all categories of projects in a capital market 
have a common expected return but each one has different dispersion of 
returns. Moreover, assume that banks cannot ascertain the riskiness of a project 
category. Then there exists a unique equilibrium such that: 1) a pooling contract 
is signed with ex·= 0, o· = 0 and F" = IJ./(1 + p); and il) social efficiency in 
aggregate investment is achieved. 
The proof of this is given in lbrahimo (1993). The implication of the 
Proposition 1 is that with all outside equity finance each entrepreneur receives 
- in both states - the same actuarially fair payoff which equals 
11- + (1 + p) (W0 - K). In equilibrium this payoff must be equal to (1 + p) W0 and 
11- + (1 + p)K for all categories of projects. That is to say, at the margin banks 
finance the marginal socially optimal investment. The intuitive explanation of 
the optimality of the equity-based contract is straightforward. When both 
categories of projects are entirely financed through outside equity their risk 
characteristic is irrelevant and, hence, they are equally attractive to risk-neutral 
financiers. As a consequence, in equilibrium there is no adverse selection 
problem and credit rationing is not viable. 
Not surprisingly, Proposition 1 mirrors the results found by de Meza and 
Webb (1987) in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, where both entrepreneurs 
and bankers are risk-neutral. Thus, the possibility of under-investment with all 
debt finance, noted by de Meza and Webb (1987) and Hillier and lbrahimo 
(1992), is ruled out in the present case under efficient equity-based 
intermediation. However, Stiglitz and Weiss would, of course, refer to moral 
hazard problems in equity markets and predict a mixed form of finance. In 
fact, the conjecture that the outside equity issue does not entail costs sounds 
illogical because of adverse incentive effects. As a matter of fact, too little effort 
may be invested by managers in the governance of firms if the Share of outside 
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financiers in the capital structure is relatively large. Monitoring of managerial 
performance could be implemented to reduce the extent to which that 
inefficiency occurs, but this would itself be costly. Thus, there must exist an 
optimal proportion of outside equity relative to debt which provides proper incen-
tives for entrepreneurs. The reason for this will be further discussed in the 
next section, where, as a consequence, the proportion of inside equity, a, is 
considered exogenously fixed and relatively large but smaller than one. The 
assumption imposed on the form of financial contracts is obviously less 
adequate than if it were derived from the first principles, but, as will be seen, 
it does provide some interesting insights. Moreover, by considering a relatively 
large, comparison with the Stiglitz and Weiss model will make more sense. 
4- Mixed form of finance 
The literature of financial markets with asymmetric information, with few 
exceptions, treats debt and equity as extreme alternative means of finance. 
This is so because optimal contracts are derived under very restrictive 
assumptions. For instance, in the previous section equity is the optimal financial 
arrangement if the adverse incentive effects arising from the actions of 
managers are not taken into account. On this matter, it does seem that the 
theory of the capital structure of modern corporations uses an approach more 
consistent with the real world. For example, Jensen and Meckling contend that, 
in entrepreneurial firms where the resources of entrepreneurs are limited, 
projects are not in general entirely financed through outside equity, since the 
entrepreneur's incentives would be diluted. The answer to the question of why 
not to support them with debt up to the hilt turns on "1) the incentive effects 
associated with highly levered firms; 2) the monitoring costs these effects 
engender; and 3} bankruptcy costs» {1976, p. 334). In other words, all debt 
finance could induce entrepreneurs to take very large ex post risks, knowing 
that proper penalties would not accrue to debtholders in the case of bankruptcy 
and gains would be captured by entrepreneurs if projects are successful. 
As perceptive financiers will see through this risk and impose a premium, debt 
security will become available on progressively worse terms. Thus, an optimal 
combination of debt and equity can be obtained if the effects of adverse 
incentives - from issuing new equity - and risk distortions -from issuing 
debt- are equalised at the margin. It is also for this reason that in 0. 
Williamson {1988} a combined use of debt and equity in the financed investment 
projects may be optimal. It does, therefore, seem useful to study the effects of 
dequity in the present framework (9). 
(9) Historical examples justifying the model of this section can also be advanced. For instance, 
in the past, in certain countries such as Germany and Japan, large banks played an important 
role in the provision not only of loan finance but also of equity finance to .firms for the purpose of 
industrial expansion. In this context, it is interesting to quote Hellwig: «During certain periods, 
especially prior to 1873, German companies obtained substantial amounts of equity finance. 
However, the shares [were] held by banks or by clients [ ... ] acting on the bank's advice, so in 
many respects, banks were as much involved in equity finance as in loan finance. While share 
markets [in Germany] were organized, they were certainly not anonymous and free for all as the 
theoretical models would have it» {1990, p. 41 ). 
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Here a special combination of debt and equity is considered. In all financial 
contracts, let a be fixed and greater than cp, i. e. a= a> cp (1°). This allows a 
clearer comparison with the Stiglitz and Weiss model. Thus, as noted before, 
if a > cp, riskier projects yield a lower expected profit for banks. And let Dmax 
be the maximum amount of debt allowed for both categories of entrpreneurs. 
Then the assumptions of the model imply that, if finance is supplied, D::; Dmax < 
RL5 < RH5 • Assume also that 0 < R' <D. Now, for a given contract (F',a*,D*) 
equations (2) and (3) become: 
(13) 
(14) 
W;5 =a (R;5 - D)+ (1 + p) (F + Wo-K) 
W/ = R' = (1 + p) (F + W0 - K) 
and equations (6) and (7) become: 
(15) 
(16) 
7t{J;= D+ (1 -a) (R;5 - D)- (1 + p)F 
1t~;= 1t~= R'- (1 + p)F 
In equilibrium (8) must equal zero, for a separating equilibrium if i = H,L, 
and for a pooling equilibrium if i= A. Using (13), (14), (15) and (16) in the 
zero expected profit condition, the expression for the offer curves is obtained 
in (F,D) space: 
(17) D = [(1 + p)/ p;a] F + Rl- 'rl-1 p;a 
with slope (1 + p)/ p;a which clearly is steeper for the riskier category. If 
P; = PA = ALPL + (1 - /..,L)pH and R/ = RA5, (17) will define the pooling offer cur-
ve. Figure 2 illustrates the lines OH, OA and OL which are the offer curves 
with i = H,A,L, respectively. Consider the line OH. Contracts on offer lying above 
(below) this line, if selected by the high-risk entrepreneurs, will cause positive 
(negative) expected profit for banks. 
Substitution of (13) and (14) for W;5 and W into (4) implies the following 
relationship for indifference curves: 
(18) P; U[Ci(R;5 - D)+ (1 + p) (F + W0 - K)] + 
+ (1 + p)U[(1 + p) (F + W0 - K)] = u 
where u is a constant and denotes a utility level. It can easily be shown that 
these curves are concave and steeper, at any point (F,D), for the riskier projects, 
as shown in figure 2 where IH and h are the indifference curves for the high-
and low-risk individuals, respectively. Moreover, indifference curves of each 
category ar!3 steeper, at any contract (F,D), than the respective bank's offer curve. 
The following lemma is useful in restrictig the value of a within particular 
limits which will provide the derivation of interesting results in the present model. 
(10) After introducing lemma 1, an additional assumption on a will be imposed. 
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Lemma 1.- There is an interval of a such that a> <p and F> K- W0 for 
all the feasible financial contracts on offer. 
The proof of this is straightforward. Suppose that F> K- W0 . From this it 
follows that [<pR' + (1- <p)!J.]/(1 + p) > K- W0. Hence, there is an interval of o: 
near <p where F > K- W0 for all possible contracts on offer. 
In what follows it is assumed that the value of !1 is within the limits of the 
interval defined by Lemma 1. That is to say, in figure 2, F = K- W must lie to 
the left of point E. Thus, in the present framework, all debt contract is not 
viable, since R' < (1 + p) (F + W0) by assumption. So it must be 1 >a> <p. 
The equilibrium solution under complete information - which will provide 
a benchmark against which to measure the effects of asymmetric information -
is now derived. This solution follows immediately upon observing that the 
expected utility of each category increases as its respective indifference curve 
moves rightwards in figure 2. Equilibrium with no private information is therefore 
achieved with the pair of separating contracts (A,C), where the contract A is 
selected by the high-risk group and C by the low-risk one. 
FIGURE 2 




-a Rf + c1- a'> tt F 
1+P 
Next, equilibria in the model with incomplete information are discussed. 
For expositional convenience, the following definition is advanced. 
Definition 2. - Let vH and vL be contracts selected by the high- and low-
risk entrepreneurs, respectively. If they involve equilibrium and cannot be 
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displaced by any other contract on offer, then vH and vL are said to be dominant 
contracts. 
Obviously, definition 2 requires incentive compatibility between banks and 
entrepreneurs. When vH = vL, equilibrium will be settled through a pooling 
contract, and with vH '* vL through separating contracts. 
Now a simple argument establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. - Consider the assumptions of the model with 1 > a= a > <p. 
Then a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. 
It is easy to prove this proposition with the help of figure 3 below. Suppose 
that P is a pooling equilibrium. Since P lies on the OA line, the offering bank 
makes on average zero expected profit. At this point, the slope of the high-
risk indifference curve, IH, is steeper than the low-risk indifference curve, ft. 
Thus there is a contract -for instance y- in the neighbourhood of P which 
low-risk entrepreneurs prefer to P. Obviously, the high-risk group prefer P to y. 
Since the contract y attracts the less risky group, it earns the offering bank a 
positive expected profit. The existence of y contradicts the definition of the 
equilibrium. Hence, the pooling contract P cannot be an equilibrium. And at all 
events, a pooling equilibrium contract at any point along the offer curve OA is 
impossible because the indifference curve of the high-risk group is steeper than 
that of the low-risk one at any contract (F,O). As a result of this, a contract 
such as y will always exist Cl 
FIGURE 3 
Non-existence of equilibrium 
F 
( 11 ) Since F> K- W0 , cp R
1 + (1- cp) Jl > (1 + p) (F + W0) and so there is an interval of 
value of ii near cp such that y will exist at any such ii. But if ii were close enough to 1 , 
a R1 + (1- a) Jl < (1 + p) (F + W0) andy might not exist. 
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The following proposition may now be advanced. 
Proposition 3.- Under the assumptions of the model, if an equilibrium 
exists then it must be established through a pair of separating contracts. 
This follows from figure 4. As shown previously, the contract on the OH 
line most preferred by category H entrepreneurs is at A, which must be part 
of an equilibrium. On the OL line the most preferred contract by the L category 
is at C. However, the pair of contracts A and C cannot be a separating 
equilibrium because of the nature of incomplete information which makes banks 
unable to distinguish the characteristics of entrepreneurs. Notice that contract 
C would attract both high- and low-risk groups and so banks would make 
negative expected profit. Then an equilibrium contract for the L category must 
lie on the /H1 locus. It is clear that on this curve, of contracts A and S, the 
one most preferred by the low-risk entrepreneurs is at S. Hence, the pair (A,S) 
- being dominant in the set of all contracts on offer - is the only possible 






The following proposition - which may be seen as a corollary of pro-
position 2 - deals with the non-existence of equilibrium. 
Proposition 4. - Under the assumptions of the model and for some 
configuration of 'AL, PL. PH and level of risk aversion, the competitive financial 
market may have no equilibrium. 
The proof of this is as follows. Suppose the values of AL, PL. PH and the 
level of risk aversion are such that the format of curves is the same as in 
figure 3. In this event, note first that the pair of separating contracts (A,S) 
cannot be an equilibrium since the pooling contract P dominates- in the sense 
of definition 2- those contracts. Indeed, in figure 3 both categories of 
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entrepreneurs prefer P to (A,S) (1 2). Then the unique candidate for the 
equilibrium is the pooling contract P. But from proposition 2 it follows that 
contract P cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, in this case there is no equilibrium. 
Note that the possibility of non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium in 
this framework is analogous to the non-existence case of Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976). It is obvious that proposition 4 is a consequence of a given configuration 
of 'AL, PL. PH and level of risk-aversion. In fact, an equilibrium will not exist if 
there is a contract like y in figure 3, and note that ys profitability will depend 
upon the composition of the entrepreneurs' population; y will make positive 
expected profit if 'AL is large enough and PA close enough to PL· It is therefore 
possible to conclude that an equilibrium will not exist if the subsidies transferred 
to high-risk individuals in pooling contracts are low, or if the costs to low-risk 
individuals in separating contracts are relative excessive. 
The possibility of equilibrium credit (and equity) rationing has been 
highlighted in a large body of literature on asymmetric information, notable early 
examples being Jaffee and Russell (1976), Keeton (1979) and Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981 ). Rationing in these models arises because of adverse selection and/or 
moral hazard effects. Adverse selection is not ruled out in the present model. 
Despite this, in the present framework credit-equity rationing is not viable, since 
rationing, as defined in Stiglitz and Weiss, is inconsistent with equilibrium defined 
by separating contracts (1 3). Thus, with risk-averse entrepreneurs and risk-neutral 
banks a similar result to that described by Bester (1985) is obtained: in the 
seemingly plausible configuration of capital market here considered, if a 
separating equilibrium exists, it must be market clearing. 
The analysis now turns to welfare properties of the equilibrium and policy 
implications. Some models of the credit market show that -from a production 
point of view- separating equilib~ium involves the first-best solution [e. g. de 
Meza and Webb (1990), and implicitly in Bester (1985)]. However, in contrast 
with this result, the following proposition is established. 
Proposition 5. -Consider the assumptions of the model with 1 > a = a > <p · 
and fl.;= fl. for all i. Then at the competitive separating equilibrium, investment 
is below its respective socially efficient level. 
The proof of this is rather complex and is given in lbrahimo (1993). Its 
basic intuition is provided below. 
The class of market here considered exhibits in equilibrium another 
efficiency problem. As in the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, there is a negative 
externality of high-risk categories on low-risk categories. The externality is purely 
dissipative, i. e. utilities in social terms are wasted. Comparing with the solution 
of perfect information, low-risk categories are worse off but high-risk categories 
are no better off. It is worth mentioning that this type of externality -which is 
(1 2) It is worth mentioning that a sufficient condition for the domination of contract P over 
contracts (A,S) is that the low-risk category must prefer P to S. For instance, it is possible to 
have another different configuration of curves such that the high-risk entrepreneurs prefer A to P 
but the less risky ones prefer P to S. However, it could easily be shown that in this case 
Proposition 3 is still valid. 
(1 3) For a more developed explanation see lbrahimo (1993). 
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due to the nature of asymmetric information - is the main cause of inefficiency 
that arises in the quantity of aggregate investment. In reality, the presence of 
high-risk entrepreneurs in the market induces low-risk entrepreneurs to demand 
lower amount of debt than they would if information were perfect. With a large 
number of entrepreneurial categories (i. e. not just two categories), since for 
each category a lower debt involves a lower value paid by banks in· exchange 
for bonds (e. g. see figure 4), the categories of projects with the highest success 
probabilities become unprofitable from the point of view of entrepreneurs and 
hence are not executed. Consequently, in equilibrium the quantity of aggregate 
investment falls short of the first-best level. 
The negative effects of high-risk entrepreneurs on low-risk ones also 
produce an inefficient risk sharing. If the level of risk borne by individuals in 
their projects under perfect information is considered optimal, then low-risk 
entrepreneurs bear too much risk with private information. The process of risk 
shifting from bankers to entrepreneurs, in the present case, is effected through 
the quantity of demand for debt. Along the offer curves, the higher the value 
of debt is the higher the risk borne by the banks in projects will be. Figure 4 
may be used to illustrate this mechanism of risk transfer. When a project is 
carried out, the portfolio of assets of the entrepreneur is composed of an amount 
of deposit and his share a in the project. The value of deposit is Fi + W0 - K 
and the value of endowment invested in the project is W0 - (G + W0 - K} = K- G. 
Let FLc be the value paid to a low-risk entrepreneur in equilibrium if there is 
complete information; and let FLs be the value paid in equilibrium with 
incomplete information. In figure 4, points C and S define these values, 
respectively. Thus, with complete information W0 = (FLc + W0 - K) + (K- FLc) and 
with incomplete W0 = (FLs + W0- K) + (K- FLs). Since FLc > FLs, it is clear that 
with private information low-risk entrepreneurs will deposit less and invest more 
in projects of their initial endowment W0 than they would with complete 
information. Hence, low-risk entrepreneurs bear too much risk in equilibrium 
with private information. Note that the risk shifting to low-risk individuals is a 
result of the lower quantity of demand for debt as Fe increases with DL along 
the contraCt curve OL (14). 
The under-investment result suggests that a policy aimed at improving 
efficiency should encourage more investment which could be achieved by a 
subsidy on bank financing. It does appear, however, that such a policy must 
be second-best since it would not dispose of negative externality on low-risk 
individuals. The implementation of policies leading to a reduction of asymmetric 
information in the market does seem very attractive. But social benefits arising 
from such policies must be compared with social costs. This type of analysis 
is, however, beyond the scope of the present partial equilibrium one. 
The present section also demonstrates that real economic decisions are 
not independent of the corporate financial structures. Against the conclusions 
( 14) Throughout the analysis it has been assumed that W0 < K. However, the relaxation of 
this assumption. may not change the results of the model, since the demand for outside finance 
(debt plus outside equity) implies risk sharing. See lbrahimo (1993). 
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resulting from the Modigliani-Miller proposition, it has been shown that capital 
structure of firms does matter. Clearly, the relative value of outside equity in 
the capital structure of firms produces a real difference in the level of aggregate 
investment in equilibrium. 
Finally, as in Harris and Raviv (1991) and Ross (1977), the model of this 
section predicts a positive correlation between leverage and default probability, 
as shown in figure 4. Firms with less risky returns will have lower debt levels. 
Signalling produces welfare costs by inducing low-risk entrepreneurs to take 
lower debt positions in their firms than they would if information could be directly 
transmitted. 
5 - Conclusion 
A shortcoming of a number of the previous studies on financial markets 
under asymmetric information is that financial arrangements either take the form 
of debt or equity. Contrary to this view, the literature on capital structure of 
modern corporations considers that there may be an optimal combination of 
debt and outside equity in the capital structure of firms. Thus, the present study 
has developed a model of financial market in which dequity is the financial 
arrangement between financiers and entrepreneurs. If the proportion of inside 
equity is relatively large, an equilibrium, if it exists, is unique and entails 
separating contracts. Equilibrium credit rationing is not viable. A novel result is 
that separating equilibrium involves too little investment. A subsidy on bank 
financing could therefore be Pareto-improving. However, because of negative 
externalities due to the presence of high-risk individuals, it seems that the best 
a policymaker could hope for would be to achieve a second-best allocation. 
In the model-letting all the terms of contract vary, but without any 
consideration of moral hazard problems - in the unique pooling equilibrium the 
capital structure of firms is entirely absorbed by the outside financiers and the 
first-best solution is achieved. Adverse incentive effects may, however, prevent 
the achievement of social efficiency. 
The analysis was restricted to only two entrepreneurial categories. It may 
be shown, however, that the propositions derived are perfectly valid in the case 
of a continuum of entrepreneurial types. The only qualification is that projects 
not satisfying condition (5) would not be carried out. The boundary line below 
which projects are not financed would thus be derived endogenously. 
Various extensions of the present analysis are possible. A natural extension 
would be to consider the multi-period analogue of the model, i. e. to allow 
entrepreneurs to invest more than once and to keep continuing relationships 
with intermediaries. The purpose of doing this would be to see if long-term 
financier-entrepreneur relationships eliminate or reduce the welfare costs. 
Another direction of research could be to incorporate explicitly into the analysis 
moral hazard problems and· derive endogenously optimal financial contracts. 
And empirical work is needed to identify the main features of contracts between 
financiers and firms. 
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